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ABSTR ACT: This study examines the relationship between firms’ credit ratings and financial
analyst earnings forecast performance. We hypothesize and find that high firm credit
ratings, which represent low task complexity and low solvency risk, are associated with less
dispersion and more accurate earnings forecasts, while low credit ratings are associated with
more dispersion and less forecast accuracy. We also find that the quality of firms’ earnings
reports moderates this relationship. The results of this study are useful to market participants
by revealing the increased (decreased) value of information contained in financial analysts’
forecasts when firms have received high (low) credit ratings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Extant literature finds that high credit ratings are valued by market participants (Hand,
Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1992) and are developed with both financial and non-financial
information. For example, credit ratings are a function of several factors including, but
not limited to, firm solvency (Pottier & Sommer, 1999), quality of earnings reports (Gray,
Mirkovic, & Ragunathan, 2006), availability of useful information (Bae et al., 2013), and
the number of financial analysts that are following the firm (Cheng & Subramanyam
2008). This paper investigates the information content of credit ratings on financial
analyst earnings forecast performance. Such an association has not been investigated
in prior literature. We posit that firm credit ratings influence financial analyst forecast
accuracy and financial analyst forecast dispersion.
It is reasonable to expect that credit ratings have an association with financial analyst
performance in predicting future earnings. First, credit ratings are the result of a
comprehensive analysis of a firm’s solvency and financial strength.
Due to their
exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which requires firms to make
material information available to all investors at the same time in order to dissuade firms
1 Corresponding author, Montana State University, USA, e-mail: nathan.jeppson@montana.edu
2 Ithaca College, USA, e-mail: mgeiszler@ithaca.edu
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from making selective disclosures to certain stakeholders, credit rating agencies have had
superior access to management (compared to the information given to financial analysts),
and since the inception of Reg FD, the value of credit ratings has increased (Jorion, Zhu,
& Charles, 2005).4 Because credit ratings contain information about the firm’s financial
position that financial analysts by regulation are prevented from obtaining, it is reasonable
to expect that credit rating information could improve financial analyst performance.
Second, because market participants place value on firms with high credit ratings, it is
likely that those firms would enjoy easier access to investment dollars and thus have more
favorable opportunities for future performance. Additionally, market participants likely
expect that a firm with a high credit rating is profitable, solvent, and expected to generate
sufficient cash flows to meet future obligations. Furthermore, because high credit ratings
are expected to be issued for solvent firms with high quality, transparent disclosures
that reduce user uncertainty and complexity, credit ratings represent an assessment of
the forecasting environment (Bae et al., 2013). Therefore, credit ratings are expected to
denote the level of forecasting difficulty. While high ratings signify less task complexity,
low credit ratings would likely be issued for firms with less transparent, lower quality
earnings reports, all of which add to uncertainty for financial analysts. Therefore, we
hypothesize that credit ratings have a significant impact on the accuracy and dispersion of
financial analyst earnings forecasts.
A limited number of studies explore the link between credit ratings and analyst forecasts.
However, unlike the present study, these studies do not use the level of credit ratings as an
explanatory variable for analyst forecast performance, but instead examine determinants
of credit rating levels and changes in ratings following earnings events. For example,
research finds that greater analyst following is associated with lower default risk as proxied
by credit ratings (Cheng & Subramanyam, 2008). Ederington and Goh (1998) show that
following a credit rating downgrade, financial analysts earnings forecasts are also revised
downward. However, they do not find that analysts revise their forecasts upward following a
credit upgrade. Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2011) explore the link between certain analyst
characteristics including forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion with credit ratings. Using
consensus analyst forecast data, they find that higher forecast dispersion is related to lower
credit ratings, but do not find a link between consensus forecast data and credit ratings.
This study is motivated by the intent to better understand the effect that credit rating
agencies ultimately have on financial analyst forecasting performance. This examination
contributes to the literature by finding an association between earnings forecast
performance and credit ratings using individual analyst forecast data and by incorporating
the influence of earnings quality and its interactive effect on this association. Because
these associations are largely unexamined in prior literature, the results of this study make
important contributions to the literature for market participants, particularly by revealing
a key determinant of forecast accuracy and dispersion. Specifically, our analysis shows
that high credit ratings are associated with more accurate and less dispersed earnings
forecasts, and that the quality of the firms’ earnings reports moderates this association.
4 Regulation Fair Disclosure took effect on October 23, 2000.
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In additional tests, our results hold for alternate specifications of forecast accuracy. These
results provide an important and unique contribution to the financial analyst forecast
performance literature and add new knowledge to the literature in several important ways.
First, by informing analysts of the predictive value contained in credit ratings these results
support analysts’ efforts to produce accurate earnings predictions. Second, by informing
market participants how credit ratings are processed by financial analysts, investors will
benefit from the knowledge that future earnings forecasts are likely more accurate for a
firm with higher credit ratings. Third, these results provide regulators with substantiation
of the value of high quality earnings reports. Finally, the results of this study aid future
researchers by revealing the significant influence that credit ratings have on financial
analyst forecasting performance.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: section 2 provides a review of the
related literature, section 3 describes the research method used, section 4 presents the test
results, section 5 offers the results of additional analysis and sensitivity testing, and section
6 provides a summary and conclusion.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Extant literature finds that high credit ratings are prized by market participants (Hand,
Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1992), and that the market reacts negatively to poor credit ratings
(Norden & Weber, 2004). Some argue that the information in bond ratings provide little
incremental data and has little value to the equity markets (Partnoy, 1999), however following
the announcement of credit ratings, there is a reaction in bond prices (Kliger & Sarig, 2000;
Norden & Weber, 2004). One explanation for this reaction is that a firm’s credit rating conveys
inside information about the company to the market, favorable or unfavorable, without
disclosing details to the public (Kliger & Sarig, 2000). Alternately, some argue that credit
rating agencies do not take advantage of this additional access to insider information (Frost,
2007). Since the inception of Reg FD, which provided an exception to credit rating agencies in
providing information that is not publicly available, the value of credit ratings has increased
(Jorion, Zhu, & Charles, 2005). Finally, research shows that credit ratings produced using
information from various public and private sources (Gray, Mirkovic, & Ragunathan, 2006),
are influenced by several factors including firm solvency (Pottier & Sommer, 1999), earnings
quality (Gray, Mirkovic, & Ragunathan, 2006), availability of useful information (Bae et al.,
2013), and financial analyst following (Cheng & Subramanyam, 2008). This paper adds to
the literature by demonstrating the contribution that credit ratings make to the environment
in which financial analyst earnings forecasts are generated.
The literature on financial analyst earnings forecast can be classified as analyst level, firm
level, or the market level. Taken together, factors in each of these classifications affect how
analysts arrive at their estimates. There are unique characteristics that affect the accuracy
of each individual financial analyst. For example, the experience that a financial analyst
has forecasting for a specific firm has been found to be associated with forecast accuracy
(Clement, 1999; Jacob, Lys, & Neale, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 1997). The size and
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type of firm where a financial analyst is employed is associated with accuracy (Clement,
1999; Jacob, Rock, & Weber, 2008). Additionally, an increase in the number of firms and
the complexity of the portfolio of firms followed by a financial analyst leads to a decrease
in the accuracy of financial analysts (Clement, 1999). Finally, the information emphasized
by financial analysts differs with the individual financial analyst’s prior level of accuracy
(McEwen & Hunton, 1999). Other literature analyzes the effect of the market environment
on the accuracy of financial analyst forecasts. The firm’s local GAAP is also shown to have an
effect on forecast estimates (Bae, Tan, & Welker, 2008; Basu, LeeSeok, & Ching-Lih, 1998;
Glaum et al., 2013). Specifically, accounting standards that are based on net asset value
lead to more accurate forecasts than standards based on historical cost reporting (Liang &
Riedl, 2014). Certain market regulations also have an effect on financial analysts accuracy
(Guan, Lu, & Wong, 2012). At the firm level, there are also important determinants of
financial analyst forecast accuracy. The clarity, quality and extent of disclosures have an
effect on financial analyst (Byard & Shaw, 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). The extent to which
a firm has diversified its holdings and operations internationally also has a measured effect
on how accurately financial analysts can forecast earnings for that firm (Duru & Reeb,
2002; Mauri, Lin & Neiva DeFigueiredo, 2013). This study contributes to the accuracy
literature by identifying another firm level determinant of forecast accuracy. Our results
provide further understanding of the source of forecast accuracy by revealing the role that
firm credit ratings play in forecast accuracy.
The information content of earnings and the quality of earnings have been extensively
examined in the literature (e.g. Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004). Several
methods of measuring the quality of earnings have been employed to document a firm’s
use of accruals in their reported earnings (e.g. Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008). Dechow and
Dichev (2002) utilize a model that measures whether current accruals are associated
with prior, current, or next period cash flows. Their model assumes that accruals should
map to cash flows in a timely manner. The mapping of accruals to cash flows is a widely
utilized method to measure the quality of cash flows and to determine if managers are
manipulating earnings (e.g. Francis et al., 2005).
Investors and managers alike widely believe that firms manage earnings to some degree
(Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Dechow and Skinner (2000) classify firms into one
of several groups according to the extent to which they engage in earnings management
including a conservative accounting group, a neutral earnings group, an aggressive
accounting group, or a fraudulent accounting group. One form of earnings management
is the manipulation of earnings to develop a smooth earnings path (Murphy 2001).
Some extant research finds that smooth earnings are desirable. For example, Barth,
Elliott, and Finn (1999) argue that investors prefer and reward a smooth earnings path.
Conversely, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), contend that management manipulates
earnings to conceal true firm performance from outsiders, thus decreasing the level of
investor protection. Still, no clear link has been shown between earnings smoothness and
firm valuation (Gao & Zhang 2015). We add to the earnings management and earnings
smoothing literature by demonstrating the role that the quality of earnings plays in the
link between credit ratings and the accuracy of forecasted earnings.
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A limited number of studies explore the link between credit ratings and analyst forecasts.
A larger number of analysts following a firm is associated with lower default risk as proxied
by credit ratings (Cheng & Subramanyam, 2008). Ederington and Goh (1998) show
that following a credit rating downgrade, financial analysts earnings forecasts are also
revised downward. However, they do not find that analysts revise their forecasts upward
following a credit upgrade. Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2011) do explore the link between
certain analyst characteristics including forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion. Using
consensus analyst forecast data, they find that higher forecast dispersion is related to
lower credit ratings, but do not find a link between consensus forecast data and credit
ratings. This paper contributes to the literature by finding an association between earnings
forecasts and credit ratings using individual analyst forecast data and by incorporating the
influence of earnings quality and its interactive effect on this association.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
As described above, credit ratings are a function of a firm’s solvency, quality of its earnings
reports, financial strength, and the availability of other useful information by which to
predict the firm’s future earnings and cash flows. Thus, we expect that the information
contained in credit ratings, regarding any one or all of these factors, add additional
information into the forecasting environment that financial analysts have available to
them in generating their forecasts.
We start our analysis by first considering the effect of the existence of a credit rating
(irrespective of good or bad) on financial analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion. In the
latter part of 2000, Reg FD was put into effect by the Security and Exchange Commission.
Prior to Reg FD, firms could selectively choose which financial information they supplied
to financial analysts. The concern was that “firm-friendly” financial analysts were given
better access than other financial analysts, and they in turn would be inclined to issue
more optimistic earnings forecasts. Prior to Reg FD, if financial analysts issued unfavorable
forecasts or recommendations, it might have resulted in their losing this preferred access to
management (Barniv et al., 2009). Although Reg FD precluded such selective disclosures
to financial analysts, credit rating agencies were specifically exempt from the regulation.
As a result, credit rating agencies continue to have access to more timely information
and to information that may not have been disclosed to financial analysts. Therefore,
credit ratings may contain additional information than that which is disclosed or made
available to financial analysts. It follows, then, that the existence of a credit rating adds
another potential piece of information for a financial analyst to consider in developing
their forecast, which would be lacking for a firm without a credit rating. Consequently, the
mere existence of a credit rating may, in and of itself, have an incremental effect on analyst
forecast performance.
It may seem obvious that the existence of a credit rating offers additional information for
a financial analyst to consider in developing their earnings forecast and, therefore, would
result in greater forecast accuracy. Indeed, there is a reasonable presumption that any
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information in addition to whatever might already be on hand or publicly available would
be helpful. However, when an analyst is facing a forecasting environment with less available
information (i.e. the lack of a credit rating), they may become more diligent in their analysis
of the information that is available to them, resulting in greater accuracy (Lehavy, Li, &
Merkley, 2011; Lobo, Song, & Stanford, 2012). Thus, a reasonable inquiry could be framed
concerning this dichotomy. Does the existence of a credit rating lull analysts into a false sense
of security, perhaps even encouraging some laziness in their analysis of the robustness of a
firm’s earnings, or does the credit rating offer some helpful, pertinent information to analysts
in the performance of their forecasts? Given that the mere existence of a credit rating may
have differential effects on financial analysts, we do not predict a positive or negative effect
of the existence of a credit rating on forecast accuracy or dispersion. To investigate this
assertion, we test the following hypothesis, stated in the null form.
Hypothesis 1. The existence of a credit rating has no effect on financial analyst earnings
forecast accuracy or financial analyst forecast dispersion.
Next, we turn our attention towards financial analyst forecast performance in only cases
where a credit rating does exist. Specifically, we consider the effect of the level or quality of
the credit rating on analyst forecast performance.
As noted in the discussion above, due to their exemption from Reg FD, credit rating
agencies have better and timelier access to information than financial analysts. Credit
ratings, however, can convey either positive or negative signals about a firm. Firms with
high credit ratings are firms with high liquidity, favorable cash flows, and strong overall
financial health. Conversely, firms with low credit ratings are firms with low liquidity,
weak cash flows, and are in financial distress. These two scenarios offer very different
information to a financial analyst about a firm.
For firms with high credit ratings, the forecasting environment is likely robust with
high quality information about a high quality firm and the task complexity involved in
generating a forecast is likely relatively low. Firms with high credit ratings are also more
likely to have more consistent earnings patterns (Gray, Mirkovic, & Ragunathan, 2006).
With more consistent earnings patterns, financial analysts are more likely to make more
accurate forecasts for these firms. In other words, high credit ratings act as both favorable
new incremental information about a firm and as additional confirmation of the quality
of the other information already available to analysts.
For firms with low credit ratings, the forecasting environment is likely lacking quality
information about a firm and the task complexity involved in generating a forecast is
likely relatively high. Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that firms with low credit
ratings experience more frequent losses (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006).
Firms with losses and more volatile earnings patterns complicate the task for financial
analysts (Elliott & Hanna, 1996). As a result, low credit ratings may offer very little new
incremental information about a firm and may actually introduce more noise into the
forecasting environment.
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Furthermore, the literature indicates that user uncertainty may reduce financial analyst
performance and that such uncertainty about a firm’s economics increases dispersion
patterns of financial analyst forecasts (Barron & Stuerke, 1998; Imhoff & Lobo, 1992; Payne
& Robb, 2000). Prior studies also indicate that high quality, transparent disclosures reduce
user uncertainty and task complexity (Lang & Lundholm, 1996), and that credit rating
agencies issue higher ratings for firms with such disclosures (Bae et al., 2013). Credit
ratings, therefore, represent an assessment of the forecasting environment. Low credit
ratings are usually associated with high levels of long term risk, signaling possible future
defaults, and noisier information environments (Pottier & Sommer, 1999). Therefore,
credit ratings denote the level of forecasting difficulty. Thus, high ratings signify less task
complexity and are expected to result in increased forecast performance, while low credit
ratings are likely issued for firms with less transparent, lower quality earnings reports,
which add to uncertainty for financial analysts and are expected to reduce forecast
performance. Because credit ratings represent a high level assessment of a firm’s long term
risk and credit-worthiness, and contain information not available to financial analysts in
a timely manner, it is reasonable to expect that financial analyst forecast accuracy will be
improved by the information contained in credit ratings. To investigate this assertion we
test the following hypotheses, stated in the alternate form.
Hypothesis 2. Financial analyst earnings forecast accuracy is increased and financial
analyst forecast dispersion is decreased for firms with high credit ratings.
The literature on how the quality of earnings could either increase or decrease forecasting
performance is unclear. For example, low quality earnings reports could decrease forecast
performance by creating a more complex, misleading information environment resulting
in over (or under) estimates. Literature finds that low quality reports could be expected
to result in more uncertainty about a firm’s future, and uncertainty is found to 1) increase
dispersion patterns of financial analyst forecasts (Barron & Stuerke, 1998; Imhoff & Lobo,
1992; Payne & Robb, 2000) and, 2) reduce cash flow forecast accuracy (Bilinski, 2014).
Thus, low earnings quality could result in misleading, and therefore unreliable earnings
reports. A weak link between earnings and cash flows will increase information risk
(Francis et al., 2005) and low earnings quality could weaken that link. Barton, Hansen,
and Pownall (2010) find that reported earnings are more value relevant when that link is
strong.
Alternatively, low earnings quality could indicate the potential for more accuracy and
less dispersion in financial analysts’ forecasts. First, a misleading and complex forecasting
environment could encourage financial analysts to resort to herding behavior. Herding
behavior theory (Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000; Mensah & Yang, 2008) suggests that
financial analysts will change their own private opinions about a company’s earnings
potential with the purpose of issuing earnings forecasts which are closer to the consensus.
Therefore, they modify their forecasts to coalesce around the estimate of other possibly
more experienced financial analysts, thus increasing their forecasting performance.
Furthermore, when earnings management is performed (through the use of discretionary
accruals or other methods) with the intent of smoothing reported earnings, a reduction
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in the variability of earnings could result (Demerjian, Lewis-Western, & McVay, 2015).
Therefore, the reduced earnings quality, due to the use of discretionary accruals to meet
earnings benchmarks (such as meeting financial analysts’ expectations), can result in the
convergence of reported earnings with financial analysts’ forecasts (Burgstahler & Eames,
2006; Matsumoto, 2002; Payne & Robb, 2000). Such a convergence reduces the forecast
errors used to measure forecast performance.
Second, firms that manage earnings typically have lower earnings quality (Dechow, Ge, &
Schrand, 2010). Firms are likely to manage earnings to meet certain benchmarks such as
positive earnings, growth in earnings or to meet financial analyst expectations (Graham,
Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Therefore, if firms manage earnings to meet financial analyst
expectations, thus resulting in greater financial analyst accuracy, they will have lower
earnings quality than firms that do not manage earnings.
For both of these reasons, poor earnings quality would be associated with increased
financial analyst performance (more accuracy and less dispersion among forecasts).
Therefore, because we believe that lower earnings quality is likely to indicate either herding
of financial analysts’ forecasts or the presence of earnings management, we predict that
low earnings quality will have a positive relationship with forecast accuracy and will
reduce forecast dispersion.
Hypothesis 3. Financial analyst earnings forecast accuracy is increased and financial
analyst forecast dispersion is decreased for firms with low earnings quality.
While we hypothesize that higher credit ratings and lower earnings quality will lead to an
increase in financial analyst forecast accuracy and a decrease in financial analyst forecast
dispersion, we predict that, when taken together, the effect of higher credit ratings on
financial analyst performance will be moderated by the effect of earnings quality. This
reduction of analyst performance when both higher credit ratings and lower earnings
quality is present may occur for two reasons. First, more profitable firms are more likely
to receive higher credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006). These
more profitable firms that receive higher credit ratings are less likely to be motivated to
manipulate their earnings and participate in myopic management.5 Since these more
profitable firms are not willing to manipulate their earnings to meet analysts’ expectations,
financial analyst accuracy declines and financial analyst dispersion increases. Second,
larger firms are also likely to receive higher credit ratings (Gray, Mirkovic, & Ragunathan,
2006). Larger firms that receive higher credit ratings are less likely to manipulate their
earnings since larger and more diversified firms have more consistent earnings and
therefore have less motivation to manipulate earnings to meet analyst expectations. Since
more profitable firms and larger firms could be less likely to manipulate earnings, we
hypothesize that the effect of credit ratings and earnings quality on analyst performance
will be moderated as follows:
5 Myopic management is the manipulation of earnings to achieve specific targets that leads to a long term
reduction in firm performance (see Mizik, 2010).
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Hypothesis 4. Earnings quality has a moderating effect on the influence that credit ratings
have on forecast accuracy and dispersion such that as earnings quality diminishes, forecast
accuracy declines and forecast dispersion increases.
3.1. Dependent Variables
To investigate the association between firm credit ratings and financial analyst forecast
accuracy, we use the absolute forecast error scaled by share price (equation 1) from prior
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3.2. Independent Variables
The credit rating variable (CR) is the S&P Domestic Long-term issuer credit rating from
Compustat (mnemonic: SPDRM). It is defined as the Standard & Poor’s Issuer Credit
Rating which represents the “current opinion of an issuer’s overall creditworthiness,
apart from its ability to repay individual obligations. This opinion focuses on the obligor’s
capacity and willingness to meet its long-term financial commitments (those with
maturities of more than one year) as they come due.” CR ranges from one to 22, with one
representing a D rating and 22 representing a AAA rating. Therefore, higher values of CR
denote that a firm has received a higher credit rating from S&P.
3.3. Control Variables
We include the controls FOLLOW, LOSS, ΔEARN, HORIZ, and VOL from prior literature
(Duru & Reeb, 2002; Mauri, Lin, & DeFigueiredo, 2013), all of which except for FOLLOW
control for complexity and uncertainty in the forecasting task. We also include controls
for the quality of reported earnings (EQ) and for the smoothness of reported earnings
(SMOOTH), both of which could also introduce uncertainty into the forecasting
environment. Finally, following Duru and Reeb (2002) and Bae, Tan and Welker (2008)
we also include controls for industry and fiscal year. FOLLOW is measured as the total
number of financial analysts following the firm for a given period. The typical expectation
is that larger financial analyst following is associated with lower forecast optimism and
greater accuracy (Drake & Myers, 2011; Duru & Reeb, 2002; Mauri, Lin, & DeFigueiredo,
2013). Furthermore, Lang and Lundholm (1996) indicate that larger following is associated
with decreases in overestimates because financial analysts prefer to follow firms with high
quality earnings reports. However, Duru and Reeb (2002) find greater following to be
positively and marginally associated with forecast accuracy and not a significant factor
for overestimates. In light of the above studies, if significant, we expect FOLLOW to be
negatively associated with dispersion and positively associated with accuracy. LOSS (an
indicator variable coded 1 if the firm reported a net loss in the period, otherwise zero) is
included because managers of firms that report losses may tend to understate net income
in order to enhance net income in subsequent periods; a practice known in the literature
as taking a “big bath” (Elliott & Hanna, 1996; Moehrle, 2002). Firms that engage in such
practices understate net income which causes forecasts to be higher than reported income.
Additionally, Brown (2001) finds that financial analysts issue more optimistic forecasts
in periods of losses, and Hwang, Jan, & Basu (1996) find that financial analysts are less
accurate while forecasting losses than when predicting positive net income. However,
Duru and Reeb (2002) find that LOSS is not significant for accuracy. We expect LOSS
to be positively associated with dispersion and negatively associated with accuracy. The
ΔEARN variable is equal to the absolute value of the change in earnings per share from
the previous year divided by the stock price at the beginning of the year. Duru and Reeb
(2002) find that larger absolute changes in earnings per share are negatively associated
with accuracy. However, because large changes in earnings could present uncertainty,
we do not predict a direction. Following prior literature the forecast horizon control
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where Dependent is either AFEP (analyst forecast accuracy variable measured as the absolute value of the
forecast error scaled by the lag of the firm’s market price) or DISP (analyst forecast dispersion variable
measured as the standard deviation of forecasts deflated by the stock price), CREXIST is an indicator
variable coded as 1 if the observation includes a Standard & Poor’s Credit Rating, and 0 otherwise.
FOLLOW is the number of financial analysts following the firm’s earnings for the period, LOSS is an
indicator variable coded one if the firm reported a net loss in the period, otherwise zero, ΔEARN is equal
to the absolute value of the change in earnings per share from the previous year divided by the stock price
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impact on financial analyst’s performance, the information must be available prior to the forecast date,
therefore EQ is lagged by one year.
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3.5. Data Sample
+ β7HORIZtj + β8VOLtj + β9IND+ β10IYEARtj

(6)

where all variables are defined as in equation (5).

3.5. Sample
Data Sample
3.5. Data
We collect a sample of company level reported data, including credit ratings, for the period
2006 to 2015 from the Compustat Annual Database. We combine individual financial
analyst forecast data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) for the
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same period. After merging data from these sources, we omit any firm-year observations
with insufficient data, any firm-year observations with a financial analyst following of
less than two, with a horizon of more than one year, and then limit the sample to the
most recent forecast for each financial analyst in each firm year. The resulting full sample
contains 100,137 firm year observations. This sample is used in our testing of Hypothesis
1. We then reduce the sample to only observations which contain a Standard and Poor’s
credit rating for each firm-year. This reduces the sample size to 88,652 observations. This
reduced sample is utilized to test the remaining Hypotheses 2 – 4.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (n=100,137)
Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

25th Percentile

75th Percentile

AFEP

-8.9569

-0.1772

1329.4

-0.5613

-0.0573

DISP

0.5133

0.0048

88.730

0.0021

0.0119

CR

8.1187

10.000

7.1398

0.0000

14.000

EQ

0.0333

0.0245

0.0324

0.0160

0.0396

FOLLOW

19.891

19.000

11.156

11.000

27.000

LOSS

0.1649

0.0000

0.3711

0.0000

0.0000

∆EARN

1.2643

0.0119

223.74

0.0056

0.0277

HORIZ

103.86

97.000

81.971

43.000

116.00

VOL

0.0626

0.0318

0.1485

0.0160

0.0661

Variable

AFEP is the absolute forecast error multiplied by -100. DISP is forecast dispersion, measure using the standard
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts deflated by the stock price on the forecast date. CR is the Standard &
Poor’s Issue Credit Rating which is the opinion of an issuer’s overall creditworthiness with codes ranging from
1 representing a D rating and 22 representing a AAA rating lagged by one period. EQ is the earnings quality
of the firm calculated as the lag of the standard deviation of the residuals from firm-specific regressions of
changes in working capital on past, present, and future operating cash flows over the prior five consecutive
years. FOLLOW is the number of analysts following the firm per I/B/E/S. LOSS is an indicator variable coded
as 1 for firm-year observations with negative earnings, and 0 otherwise. ∆EARN is the change in earnings,
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the current year’s earnings per share and the previous
year’s earnings per share. HORIZ is the forecast horizon, expressed as the number of days between the forecast
and the end of the fiscal year. VOL is earnings volatility, measure as the standard deviation of earnings per
share for the previous 5-year period.

Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the test variables of our models. The mean
and median values of -8.9569 and -0.1772 for AFEP are negative by design and indicate
the difference between a financial analyst’s earnings forecast and the actual earnings.
The median value for CR is 10, the equivalent of a BB- rating which Standard and Poor’s
defines as indicative that the obligor faces major ongoing uncertainties. The average
forecast horizon for the sample is only 103.86 days or more than three months. The mean
and median values for FOLLOW are 19.891 and 19 and the 25th and 75th percentiles are
11 and 27 indicating that the majority of the firms in the sample have more than a dozen
financial analysts providing estimates for the firms for any given firm-year. The variable

360

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 20 | No. 3 | 2018

EQ has mean and median values of 0.0333 and 0.0245 as measured using the lag of changes
in working capital on past, present and future operating cash flows over the prior five
consecutive years. While the period for our sample covers the years from 2006 to 2015,
this variable draws on data that extends back to the year 2001 due to its use of information
from prior periods to construct firm-specific regressions regarding the mapping of cash
flows to accruals. The mean value for LOSS is 0.1649 indicating that only a small portion
of the sample includes firms with negative annual earnings.
Table 2
Pearson/Spearman Correlations (n=100,137)
FOLLOW LOSS
∆EARN HORIZ
VOL
AFEP
DISP
CR
EQ
AFEP
1 -0.62357 0.11709 -0.07246 0.14784 -0.32649 -0.43561 -0.15724 -0.24791
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
DISP
-0.63008
1 -0.15145 0.09655 -0.16367 0.45636 0.54070 -0.01567 0.37320
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
CR
0.19711 -0.24303
1 -0.16883 0.36279 -0.19109 -0.14302 -0.09893 -0.25994
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
EQ
-0.12222 0.15802 -0.20313
1 -0.15136 0.07581 0.12569 0.02829 0.22144
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
FOLLOW 0.24023 -0.23126 0.41250 -0.19041
1 -0.13684 -0.17202 -0.08250 -0.12465
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
LOSS
-0.31926 0.44566 -0.21774 0.07663 -0.14276
1 0.31492 0.03120 0.38453
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
∆EARN
-0.39958 0.59119 -0.18572 0.16353 -0.18002 0.29278
1 0.00675 0.35388
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0326
<.0001
HORIZ
-0.16101 -0.02395 -0.15771 0.04341 -0.14183 0.04475 0.00025
1 0.02866
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.9376
<.0001
VOL
-0.34879 0.53286 -0.29018 0.27947 -0.11008 0.41424 0.43373 0.00237
1
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.4539
Pearson correlations are shown above the diagonal. Spearman are shown below. Note that the correlation
value is shown with the associated p-value immediately below. All variables are defined in Table 1.

Table 2 provides the Pearson and Spearman correlations. The Pearson correlations are
reported above the diagonal and the Spearman correlations are reported below the
diagonal. Most of the correlations between the independent variables exhibit relatively
small correlations. The test variables, AFEP and CR are positively correlated for both the
Pearson and Spearman measures. Additionally, DISP and CR are negatively correlated
for both the Pearson and Spearman measures. This offers preliminary evidence regarding
Hypothesis 2.
4. RESULTS
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (4) with AFEP as the dependent
variable, while Panel B provides the results of the same model with DISP as the dependent
variable. The coefficient on CREXIST is negative and significant at the one percent level
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for the test with AFEP as the dependent variable, indicating that the existence of a credit
rating is associated with less financial analyst forecast accuracy. Similarly, for the test with
DISP as the dependent variable, the coefficient on CREXIST is positive and significant.
This indicates that the existence of a credit rating is associated with greater dispersion in
forecast patterns. As discussed in Section 3, while a credit rating contains information that
may improve the forecast performance of financial analysts, the results in Table 3 indicate
less accuracy and more dispersion for firms where a credit rating exists. This could be due
to the theory that analysts exert more effort in making their forecasts when there is less
available information. Therefore, by rejecting Hypothesis 1, which was stated in the null
form, we find a significant association between the existence of a credit rating and analyst
forecast performance.
Table 3
Rating Availability with AFEP and DISP including EQ
Panel A
Panel B
Dependent variable: AFEP
Dependent variable: DISP
Independent Variable
Coefficient
Coefficient
Intercept
0.3588 ***
0.0000 ***
CREXIST
-0.0674 ***
0.0006 ***
10.440 ***
-0.0974 ***
FOLLOW1
LOSS
-1.1006 ***
0.0163 ***
ΔEARN
-14.110 ***
0.1596 ***
-4.1100 ***
0.0015 **
HORIZ1
VOL
-1.4896 ***
0.0378 ***
IND
Included
Included
YEAR
Included
Included
0.2752
0.4196
Adjusted R2
n
100,137
100,137
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance utilizing heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. 1These coefficients are multiplied by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. CREXIST is
an indicator variable coded as 1 if the observation includes a Standard & Poor’s Issue Credit Rating, and 0
otherwise. IND is an industry control using the I/B/E/S industry classification. YEAR is an annual control
representing the year in which firm j’s earnings are reported. All other variables are defined in Table 1.

Consistent with prior literature, FOLLOW is significant in both tests indicating that
when more financial analysts follow a firm, financial analysts are more accurate and
are less dispersed in their earnings forecasts. The coefficient on LOSS is significant for
all tests indicating that financial analysts are less accurate and more dispersed for firms
that experience a loss in the current period. Prior literature demonstrates that financial
analysts in some cases fail to predict failures and as a result, firms with losses are more
likely to be associated with negative earnings surprises (Skinner & Sloan, 2001; Kinney,
Burgstahler, & Martin, 2002).
The ΔEARN control is highly significant for all tests. The negative sign for tests with AFEP
as the dependent variable suggests that larger absolute increases in earnings from the prior
period are associated with less accurate forecasts of future earnings. HORIZ is significant

362

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 20 | No. 3 | 2018

in both tests of dispersion, indicating that shorter time periods between forecasts and
earnings disclosures leads to more accuracy and less dispersion. Finally, as predicted the
VOL control is significant in both tests. VOL represents the volatility in a firms reported
earnings, thus a negative result for tests involving forecast accuracy indicate that a lack
of smooth earnings from year to year increases the likelihood of forecast inaccuracy and
a positive result for tests involving dispersion indicate that a lack of smooth earnings
increases forecast dispersion.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (5). The first two columns
of results provide the results of estimating equation (5) with AFEP as the dependent
variable, while the final two columns provides the results of the same models with DISP
as the dependent variable. Note that, as predicted, the coefficient on CR are positive
and significant at the one percent level for the test with AFEP as the dependent variable
indicating that higher levels of CR are associated with more financial analyst forecast
accuracy. This result supports Hypothesis 2 and indicates that financial analysts produce
more accurate earnings forecasts for firms with higher credit ratings. Similarly, for the
test with DISP as the dependent variable, the coefficient on CR is negative and significant.
This also supports Hypothesis 2 and indicates that financial analysts’ earnings forecast
estimates are less dispersed for firms with higher credit ratings.
Table 4
Rating with AFEP and DISP including EQ
Panel A
Panel B
Dependent variable: AFEP
Dependent variable: DISP
Independent
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Variable
Intercept
-0.0629
-0.4636 ***
0.0069 ***
0.0100 ***
CR
0.0352 ***
0.0674 ***
-0.0007 ***
-0.0010 ***
EQ
0.9469 **
19.4343 ***
-0.0183 ***
-0.1617 ***
CR*EQ
-1.4310 ***
0.0111 ***
10.2900 ***
10.3000 ***
-0.0173 **
-0.0173 **
FOLLOW1
LOSS
-1.3173 ***
-1.3158 ***
0.0173 ***
0.0173 ***
ΔEARN
-19.0601 ***
-19.1496 ***
0.2170 ***
0.2177 ***
-3.8300 ***
-3.8400 ***
0.0013
0.0014 *
HORIZ1
VOL
-2.2852 ***
-2.4680 ***
0.0758 ***
0.0772 ***
IND
Included
Included
Included
Included
YEAR
Included
Included
Included
Included
0.3350
0.3363
0.4830
0.4837
Adjusted R2
n
88,652
88,652
88,652
88,652
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance utilizing heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. 1These coefficients are multiplied by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. IND is an
industry control using the I/B/E/S industry classification. YEAR is an annual control representing the year in
which firm j’s earnings are reported. All other variables are defined in Table 1.

Also as predicted, the coefficient on EQ is positive and significant for the test with AFEP as
the dependent variable indicating that lower earnings quality, as indicated by higher levels
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of EQ, is associated with more financial analyst forecast accuracy. This result supports
Hypothesis 3 and indicates that financial analysts produce more accurate earnings
forecasts for firms with lower earnings quality due to their management of earnings
to match financial analysts’ earnings expectations. Similarly, for tests with DISP as the
dependent variable, the coefficient on EQ is negative and significant. This also supports
Hypothesis 3 and indicates that financial analysts’ earnings forecast estimates are less
dispersed for firms with lower earnings quality and therefore more dispersed for firms
with better earnings quality.
Consistent with prior literature, FOLLOW is significant in all four tests indicating that
when more financial analysts follow a firm, financial analysts are more accurate and are
less dispersed in their earnings forecasts. The coefficient on LOSS is significant for all
tests indicating that financial analysts are less accurate and more dispersed for firms
that experience a loss in the current period. Prior literature demonstrates that financial
analysts in some cases fail to predict failures and as a result, firms with losses are more
likely to be associated with negative earnings surprises (Skinner & Sloan, 2001; Kinney,
Burgstahler, & Martin, 2002).
The ΔEARN control is highly significant for all tests. The negative sign for tests with
AFEP as the dependent variable suggests that larger absolute increases in earnings from
the prior period are associated with less accurate forecasts of future earnings. Recall that
ΔEARN is the absolute value of the change in earnings per share from the previous year
scaled by price. This result is likely due to financial analysts’ uncertainty when faced with
large changes in earnings from one period to the next. HORIZ is not significant in our
tests of dispersion, but consistent with prior literature is significant for tests involving
accuracy. Finally, as predicted the VOL control is significant in all tests. VOL represents
the volatility in a firms reported earnings, thus a negative result for tests involving forecast
accuracy indicate that a lack of smooth earnings from year to year increases the likelihood
of forecast inaccuracy and a positive result for tests involving dispersion indicate that a
lack of smooth earnings increases forecast dispersion.
Table 4 also provides the results of estimating equation (6), which includes the interaction
of credit ratings with earnings quality (CR*EQ). As in our prior test, the main effect
of CR is positive and significant (0.0352, p<0.0001). Note that all the control variables’
direction and significance are also consistent with the prior test. The CR*EQ interaction
term is negative and significant (-1.4310, p<0.0001) indicating that the quality of reported
earnings affects the influence that credit ratings have on forecast accuracy. Specifically,
at higher levels of credit ratings, the negative association between earnings quality
and financial analyst forecast accuracy is reduced. This result is consistent with our
expectations regarding the moderating effect that earnings quality has on the relationship
between credit ratings and financial analyst forecast accuracy and provides evidence for
the moderating effect of earnings quality anticipated by Hypothesis 4.
The results with DISP as the dependent variable similarly support our hypothesis regarding
the moderating effect of earnings quality. For the test involving forecast dispersion, the
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CR*EQ interaction term is positive and significant (-0.1617, p<0.0001) indicating that the
quality of reported earnings affects the influence that credit ratings have on forecast accuracy.
Specifically, at higher level of credit ratings, the positive association between earnings quality
and financial analyst forecast dispersion is reduced. This result is also consistent with our
expectations for Hypothesis 4 regarding the moderating effect that earnings quality has on
the relationship between credit ratings and financial analyst forecast accuracy.
For each of our tests that do not include interaction variables in Table 4, the variance
inflation factors for all of the independent variables are less than 4, indicating low levels
of multicollinearity among the independent variables.6 We also test the null hypothesis
that there is constant variance of the residuals using the White test for all models. We
find that heteroscedasticity is present and we therefore calculate all significance levels
for our tests using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Additionally, we test for
autocorrelation and find evidence that the residuals may not be independent. We therefore
re-estimate our model correcting for autocorrelation and find similar results.
Figure 1

Analyst Forecast Error by Credit Rating
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Figure 1 provides further analysis of the relationship between credit ratings and analyst
forecast accuracy. Figure 1 shows an increase in analyst forecast accuracy as the credit
rating of a firm increases. The increase in accuracy is most pronounced from the lowest
ratings which are “D, CCC-, CCC” which have a median AFEP value of -20.248 to
“CCC+” ratings which have a median AFEP value of -3.4464.7 However, increases in
6 The largest variance inflation factors in these models occur among the industry control dummy variables
with the largest value at 3.3. The variance inflation factor for all other independent variables is less than 2.
7 We combine firms with a “D”, “CCC-“, or a “CCC” rating due to the small number of firms that receive
these ratings. Only a combined 77 of the 88,652 observations with a credit rating in our sample received one
of these three ratings. In contrast, 452 firms received a “CCC+” rating.
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accuracy continue throughout each of the non-investment grade ratings to firms with a
“BB+” rating which have a median AFEP value of -0.2039. There is much less variation in
investment grade ratings as “BBB-” rated firms have a median AFEP value of -0.1860 and
firms with a “AAA” rating have a median AFEP value of -0.0944 with no investment grade
rated firm having a median AFEP value of more than -0.0661. While there is not as much
improvement in forecast accuracy as credit ratings improve for investment grade firms,
there is dramatic improvement in forecast accuracy among non-investment grade firms
However,
accuracyacross
continue
each ofFigure
the non-investment
grade
ratings to firms
as credit
ratings increases
increase.inOverall,
allthroughout
credit ratings,
1 shows that
as credit
a “BB+”
rating
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ratings with
increase,
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is awhich
clear have
increase
in forecast
accuracy.

investment grade ratings as “BBB-” rated firms have a median AFEP value of -0.1860 and firms with a
“AAA” rating have a median AFEP value of -0.0944 with no investment grade rated firm having a
median AFEP value of more than -0.0661. While there is not as much improvement in forecast accuracy
5. ADDITIONAL
AND SENSITIVITY
TESTS
as credit ratingsANALYSES
improve for investment
grade firms, there
is dramatic improvement in forecast accuracy
among non-investment grade firms as credit ratings increase. Overall, across all credit ratings, Figure 1
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perform four additional tests. First, we use smoothness as an alternative measurement of earnings quality.
Second, we utilize credit rating changes instead of the actual credit rating as an alternative specification.
Third, we test for endogeneity using Granger causality tests. Last, we replicate our testing using
5.1. Smoothness
as a Measure
Earnings
Quality
alternative specifications
of of
analyst
forecast
accuracy.
5.1. Smoothness
as ausing
Measure
of EarningsasQuality
We replicate
our results
smoothness
an alternative measure of earnings quality
to test the consistency of reported earnings. As in prior literature (e.g. Leuz, Nanda, &
replicate our results using smoothness as an alternative measure of earnings quality to test the
Wysocki, 2003;We
Gao
& Zhang, 2015), we compute smoothness of earnings as follows:
consistency of reported earnings. As in prior literature (e.g. Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Gao &
Zhang, 2015), we compute smoothness of earnings as follows:
σ ( NI / ASSETS ) j ,t
(6)
SMOOTH j ,t =
σ (CFO / ASSETS ) j , t
where for firm j and at time t:
σ
= standard deviation over the most recent 5 year period
where for firm
j and at time t:= net income
NI
σ 			
= =standard
over the most recent 5 year period
CFO
cash flowdeviation
from operations
NI 			
=
net
income
ASSETS
= total assets.

CFO 		
= cash flow from operations
Because higher=levels
variance in earnings relative to cash flows indicate that a firm’s earnings
ASSETS 		
total of
assets.

are more volatile, higher levels of SMOOTH indicate lower levels of earnings smoothness. Conversely,
lower levels of variance in earnings relative to cash flows indicate that earnings are more consistent.
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earnings path. As is the case with overall earnings quality, this manipulation of earnings
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Table 5 about
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can increase the uncertainty of the forecasting
environment
and
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of the forecasting environment leading to a reduction in financial analyst forecast

When substituting the SMOOTH variable for EQ in our equations (5) and (6), we find that, with
the exception of the result for the VOL control, our results are consistent with Table 4. Our results in
Table 5 demonstrate that firms with higher credit ratings and smoother earnings are associated with more
accurate financial analyst forecasts. In Table 5, we also find some evidence that higher credit ratings and
smoother earnings are associated with less forecast dispersion. While in our tests of equation (5) only
higher credit ratings are associated with lower forecast dispersion, our tests of equation (6) show that both
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accuracy and more dispersion among financial analyst forecasts. Therefore, we expect that
SMOOTH will have a negative effect on financial analyst accuracy or AFEP and a positive
effect on DISP.
Table 5
Rating with AFEP and DISP including SMOOTH
Panel A
Panel B
Dependent variable: AFEP
Dependent variable: DISP
Independent
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Variable
Intercept
0.0272
0.5913 ***
0.0062 ***
0.0032 ***
CR
0.0370 ***
-0.0016
-0.0007 ***
-0.0005 ***
SMOOTH
-0.0974 ***
-0.4565 ***
0.0001
0.0020 ***
CR*EQ
0.0258 ***
-0.0001 ***
9.1900 ***
9.2200 ***
-0.0159 *
-0.0160 *
FOLLOW1
LOSS
-1.2732 ***
-1.2190 ***
0.0173 ***
0.0170 ***
ΔEARN
-19.2472 ***
-18.9791 ***
0.2169 ***
0.2155 ***
-3.8200 ***
-3.8000 ***
0.0013
0.0012
HORIZ1
VOL
0.4150
0.2987
0.0703 ***
0.0709 ***
IND
Included
Included
Included
Included
YEAR
Included
Included
Included
Included
0.3369
0.3434
0.4828
0.4845
Adjusted R2
n
88,652
88,652
88,652
88,652
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance utilizing heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. 1These coefficients are multiplied by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. IND is an
industry control using the I/B/E/S industry classification. YEAR is an annual control representing the year in
which firm j’s earnings are reported. All other variables are defined in Table 1.

When substituting the SMOOTH variable for EQ in our equations (5) and (6), we find
that, with the exception of the result for the VOL control, our results are consistent
with Table 4. Our results in Table 5 demonstrate that firms with higher credit ratings
and smoother earnings are associated with more accurate financial analyst forecasts. In
Table 5, we also find some evidence that higher credit ratings and smoother earnings are
associated with less forecast dispersion. While in our tests of equation (5) only higher
credit ratings are associated with lower forecast dispersion, our tests of equation (6)
show that both higher credit ratings and smoother earnings are both associated with
less forecast dispersion. Additionally, we find that our tests regarding the interaction
between credit ratings and earnings smoothness and its effect on accuracy and
dispersion remain significant. Specifically, at higher level of credit ratings, both the
negative association between earnings quality and financial analyst forecast accuracy
and the positive association between earnings smoothness and financial analyst forecast
dispersion are reduced. Taken together with our results from Table 4, our results when
substituting SMOOTH for EQ in our equations (5) and (6), we find further evidence for
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.
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5.2. Change in Credit Rating
In some cases, prior literature utilizes the change in credit rating to study external reports
of a firm’s financial position (Ederington & Goh, 1998); therefore we replicate our results
utilizing this measure in place of the firm’s current rating.
Table 6
Change in rating with AFEP and DISP including EQ
Panel A
Panel B
Dependent variable: AFEP
Dependent variable: DISP
Independent
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Variable
Intercept
0.3454 ***
0.3501 ***
-0.0020 ***
-0.0019 ***
ΔCR
0.2373 ***
0.2749 ***
-0.0026 ***
-0.0022 ***
EQ
0.5205
0.5547
-0.0107 ***
-0.0103 ***
CR*EQ
-1.8085 *
-0.0214 **
13.6500 ***
13.5600 ***
-0.0907 ***
-0.0917 ***
FOLLOW1
LOSS
-1.2904 ***
-1.2955 ***
0.0177 ***
0.0176 ***
ΔEARN
-19.1504 ***
-19.1763 ***
0.2209 ***
0.2206 ***
-3.8500 ***
-3.8500 ***
0.0018 **
0.0018 **
HORIZ1
VOL
-3.1104 ***
-3.0802 ***
0.0910 ***
0.0914 ***
IND
Included
Included
Included
Included
YEAR
Included
Included
Included
Included
0.3381
0.3382
0.4833
0.4833
Adjusted R2
n
88,652
88,652
88,652
88,652
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance utilizing heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. 1These coefficients are multiplied by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. IND is an
industry control using the I/B/E/S industry classification. YEAR is an annual control representing the year in
which firm j’s earnings are reported. All other variables are defined in Table 1.

Our results in Table 6 indicate that our results regarding the relationships between credit
ratings, earnings quality and forecast accuracy as well as forecast dispersion are essentially
unchanged. The significance level of the interaction variables decreases, but remains
consistent. These results again confirm Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 regarding the association
between financial analysts’ forecasts and firm credit ratings and earnings’ attributes.
5.3. Endogeneity between Credit Ratings and Financial Analyst Forecast Performance
As outlined above, we expect that firms with higher credit ratings allow for financial analysts
to make their earnings forecast for a firm with more accuracy and less uncertainty. However,
the possibility exists that financial analyst activity itself could have an effect on the credit
ratings that are issued. For example, Cheng and Subramanyam (2008) find that a reduction
in financial analysts following a firm leads to a decrease in credit ratings. Similarly, Mansi,
Maxwell, and Miller (2011) find that an increase in financial analyst activity leads to a
decrease in credit yields. Therefore, it is possible that an endogenous relationship exists
between credit ratings and financial analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion. We examine
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this possibility by performing Granger causality tests to explore the connection between
financial analyst activity and credit ratings. In untabulated results, we find results similar
to those of Ederington and Goh (1998), in that Granger causality flows both ways. Our
testing demonstrates significant results when regressing forecast accuracy on both prior
period credit ratings and prior period forecast accuracy. At the same time, we also find
significant results when regressing credit ratings on both prior period forecast accuracy and
prior period credit ratings. While these results provide some evidence that credit ratings
have an effect on performance of financial analysts, financial analyst activity also can have a
simultaneous effect on the reports issued by credit rating agencies.
5.4. Alternative Measures of Analyst Forecast Accuracy
We replicate our results using several alternate measures of forecast accuracy to test the
sensitivity of our results to other measures of analyst forecast accuracy. First, we replicate
our results using two alternate measures in the numerator. Prior literature has utilized
a log transformation to reduce skewness in variables (Nikolaev 2010). Therefore, we
begin our alternate measurement analysis by computing the natural log of the difference
8
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the net
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accuracy, we compute forecast error (EPSAFEP) as follows:
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where for analyst i, firm j, and at time t:
where for analyst i, firm j, and at time t:
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Overall, when utilizing these three alternative specifications of analyst forecast accuracy,
we find largely similar results. For example, when testing our results utilizing the natural
5
Although,
interpretativebetween
purposes, we
multiplyforecasts
all other forecast
error equations
in this study
because
log
of thefordifferences
analyst
and earnings
(LNAFEP)
as bya (-100),
part of
of the diminutive
resulting by
the logthe
transformation
7, note that
we multiply
the numerator
equation
(5), invalues
untabulated
results
coefficientinofequation
CR remains
positive
and significant
atby
1000, and therefore multiply the forecast error by (-1).
one
percent indicating that higher accuracy in analysts’ forecasts of earnings is associated
with firms that have higher credit ratings. Further, the coefficient of EQ remains positive
and significant, but the level of significance drops from five percent to ten percent. When
utilizing the alternative specification SQAFEP that determines analyst forecast error
by calculating the squared difference between the forecast and the actual earnings, in
untabulated results we find that the correlation between SQAFEP and CR is positive and
significant. However, when SQAFEP is included as the dependent variable in equation (5),
the coefficient on CR is negative and significant. In further testing, after winsorizing each
of the continuous variables at 5%, and testing again SQAFEP as the dependent variable
in equation (5), the coefficient on CR is again positive and significant at 1% indicating
that outliers are the cause of our spurious results in the initial test of SQAFEP in equation
(5). Finally, when replicating our results with earnings per share as an alternate to share
price in the denominator of the measure as described above (EPSAFEP) in equation (5),
in untabulated results the results are consistent with our main tests as we find that the
coefficient on CR is positive and significant at 1% and the coefficient on EQ is positive and
significant at 5%.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Using models of forecast performance from prior literature, we examine the relationship
of credit ratings with the accuracy of financial analysts’ forecasts and the dispersion
of forecasts. Controlling for factors that are known in the literature to introduce task
complexity into the forecasting environment, we hypothesize that high credit ratings are
associated with more accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts. This study provides
several new results. First, we find that the existence of a firm’s credit ratings during the

370

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 20 | No. 3 | 2018

forecasting horizon has a significant impact on the accuracy and dispersion patterns
of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. Second, we find that higher credit ratings are
associated with more accurate forecasts and less dispersed forecast patterns. Next, we find
that the level of a firm’s earnings quality moderates the effect that credit ratings have on
analyst performance. This particular result suggests that the coexistence of high credit
ratings and high quality earnings reports provides a less complex and more forecastfriendly environment. In additional testing we use three alternate specifications of
forecast accuracy to repeat our tests. The results of these alternate tests are consistent with
our primary findings.
This study is motivated by making contributions that provide 1) analysts with
confirmation of the usefulness of credit ratings in assessing future earnings, 2) regulators
with further evidence of the importance of high quality earnings reports, 3) investors
with the knowledge that future earnings forecasts are likely more accurate for a firm with
higher credit ratings, and 4) researchers with additional insights of the determinants of
financial analyst forecasting performance. Additionally, these results also add to the body
of literature that illustrates how task complexity hinders the predictive value of earnings
reports.
Our results allow for related future research in several ways. First, future studies could
explore the link between credit ratings and changes in financial analysts’ performance
based on whether it is classified as investment grade, speculative grade, or other various
subcategories. Second, future studies could utilize measures of relative analyst forecast
accuracy to determine whether there is an interactive effect between credit ratings and
specific analyst characteristics, such as analyst experience, on their performance. Finally,
extensions of this research could examine whether and to what degree the level of credit
ratings interact with other variables known in the literature to have a significant impact on
forecast accuracy and dispersion.
Our research is subject to certain limitations. As we have reported in our testing, while
we find that credit ratings have an effect on financial analyst performance, there is also a
simultaneous effect that financial analysts’ earnings forecasts may have on credit ratings
themselves. Additionally, the Compustat database utilized in this study includes Standard
& Poor’s credit ratings exclusively and thus future research could duplicate our testing
with data from all rating agencies. Finally, although we use controls in our testing that are
common for this area in the literature, as is the case in all empirical research our models
may be misspecified due to the possibility of omitted control variables.
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